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difference lies. Essentially, the emphasis in single case studies is
on dissociations; however, what is not properly recognized is
that group studies are typically concerned with associations and
relationships. Shallice is at pains to argue that the value of single
cases lies in the information they give concerning dissociation of
deficits; he argues consistently against using associations in
developing theory (pp. 35; 61; 207). The essential argument
given is that an association is not of value because it may later be
contradicted by a dissociation, whereas the converse does not
hold for a dissociation. The problem, however, is that this is a
very general argument. The same logical point was made by
Hume (1789) concerning any causal analysis:
Even when experience has informed us of the constant conjunction of
two objects it is impossible for us to satisfy ourselves by our reason
why we should extend that experience beyond those particular
instances which have fallen under our observation, (p. 648)
Shallice's argument thus applies to any observed relationship or
association. It is quite true that single cases are a poor and
unreliable source of information concerning relationships. This
is a well-recognized problem with single cases and one of the
main reasons for studying groups of patients. If one looks at the
questions posed by studies of groups of patients they typically
concern relationships not dissociations. Common questions are
the relationship of cognitive impairment to other aspects of
psychological impairment and to underlying brain damage. The
methodology adopted in conducting and analyzing group stud-
ies is typically designed to answer such questions.
Single cases have always provided an important source of
neuropsychological evidence and will continue to do so. The
strength of the single-case approach is in revealing functional
dissociations; but it is a poor guide to associations. On the other
hand, group studies are of particular value in investigating
relationships and associations. Seen in this light, Shallice's view
that neuropsychological evidence should be restricted to dis-
sociations is unsatisfactory. It is unconvincing that there will be
long-term progress in a science which does not seek information
concerning relationships. The future for cognitive neuropsy-
chology must surely lie with study of both groups and
individuals.
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The commentators on From neuropsychology to mental
structure (henceforth Neuropsychology) have in general
been gracious in their criticism. The negative parts of
their critiques, however, when combined, make a formi-
dable assault on the set of positions I advocated. There
were criticisms of the detailed neuropsychological meth-
odology, the general theoretical perspective, and specific
views on short-term memory, amnesia, attention and its
disorders, and executive functions and consciousness. All
these are discussed in turn, but first I would like to make
two general points: The first concerns what the book is
about.
Response/ Shallice: Neuropsychology
1. The focus of the book
Many felt that the empirical base was too narrow (An-
drews, Butter & Laeng, Cowan, Grodzinsky, and
Smith). Where my discussion of theories of particular
functions (e.g., memory [Smith] and executive functions
[Butter & Laeng]) ignored evidence from other neu-
robiological disciplines I consider the criticism justified.
With respect to Butter & Laeng's stress on the general
importance of lesion localisation in neuropsychology,
however, I would agree with Frith that the traditional
neuropsychological approach seems much less helpful
with functional syndromes analysed by single-case study
methods because of the difficulty of localising the func-
tional lesion adequately (see section 9.4; for a concrete
example - the short-term memory syndrome - see the
discussion in Shallice & Vallar 1990).
Andrews in particular sees the book as being primarily
about the general theory of mental organisation, hence far
too limited in what information it considers. The book I
should have written he argues, would have paid more
attention to developmental and cross-cultural data on
localisation and recovery of function and to evidence from
populations with structural limitations (e.g., the deaf) and
special characteristics (e.g., idiot savants) using PET,
SPECT, evoked responses, and so on.
Had I been attempting to write a work in the spirit of
Fodor's (1983) on modularity, I would agree with An-
drews . It is implicit in his view, however, that findings
derived by the methods he advocates are theoretically
transparent and convergent, applicable without detailed
specialized knowledge. As Cowan points out, however,
"the full set of tools . . . falls beyond any single investiga-
tor's expertise." These diverse data appear on the surface
to point in many different directions (see Neuropsychol-
ogy p. 5). Hence there is a very real danger of "confir-
matory bias" in interpreting them from a preexisting
theoretical framework derived from another speciality.
Smith in fact accuses me of such a bias in my limited use of
localisation evidence with respect to executive and mem-
ory functions. I see no reason why studies using a tech-
nique like PET scanning, which involves very complex
normalisation and statistical procedures, should turn out
to be any more transparent. For example, in the very
interesting PET scanning study of Peterson et al. (1988),
certain semantic processing is held to be frontally lo-
calised, whereas neuropsychological evidence points to a
fairly posterior temporal lobe localisation (e.g., Cappa et
al. 1981). How can one assess such a clash of evidence
without a detailed knowledge of both methodologies?
Neuropsychology is accordingly concerned with gener-
al theoretical questions, but on the (one hopes secure)
base of one primary methodology (cognitive neuropsy-
chology), which is examined in depth and compared with
a second one (cognitive psychology) that is presumed to
be generally better understood. The book is therefore
more in the spirit of Posner's (1978) work on mental
chronometry than Fodor's (1983) on modularity.
A consequence of this more restricted view is that
Neuropsychology does not provide a very good starting
point for answering Jerison's provocative questions about
evolution. My opinions (e.g., about language) are much
the same as his, but most of the methods of neuropsychol-
ogy discussed are applicable only to humans. Indeed, for
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Chapters 3-7 the underlying functional architecture is
assumed to be specific to humans. The topics treated in
Chapters 13-16 are, of course, also approachable by
general neuroscientific procedures, and in these I have
made the standard assumption of a qualitative similarity
in functional architecture between humans and the high-
er mammals. As Jerison points out with respect to blind-
sight and split-brain studies, my treatment In these chap-
ters tends to omit relevant animal studies that were
historically Important In the development of neuro-
psychology.
2. Criticisms of accounts of particular areas
2.1. Criticisms of specific theories applied to the neuro-
psych®flogical ewidence* Neuropsychology has two main
empirical sections. The substantive arguments of four of
the more speculative later chapters (11-16) were crit-
icised in detail. By contrast, only one of the six earlier
empirical chapters (3-8) - on short-term memory - was-
substantively criticised; the chief criticism of these chap-
ters was that the theorising was insufficiently detailed.
Thus In nearly all the fields In which I argued that
cognitive neuropsychology methodology should be
judged, the specific arguments presented were not con-
tested. The disputes over methodology, to which I now
turn, were not reflected in a rejection of the specific
theoretical conclusions that resulted when the meth-
odology was applied. At worst, the theory was held to be
"impoverished" (McCloskey & Caramazza) or "under-
detailed" (Grodzlesky) on the basis of a few studies
completed since the book was written!
3. Neuropsychologicai inference
3-1. SIngfe-case and group studies. I considered the
section on methodology as perhaps a little dull, but
necessary to justify both the many types of empirical
study to which I referred and the particular approach I
took to single-case studies, which is at odds with much
current practice. Yet the reaction to this section was far
more negative than to the specific claims made In particu-
lar areas. This was also the only section where it seemed
that the positions attributed to me by certain critics were
the mirror-Images of their own positions rather than the
ones for which I was attempting to argue.
One set of criticisms, however, was qualitatively differ-
ent from the others, namely, that of Grodzinsky0 For him
there was no point In these sections at all. "Neuropsy-
chology . . . Is just another method for probing mental
operations" and it "does not require unique research
strategies; hence all the "methodological" consider-
ations . . . are completely beside the point." This might
mean that anything goes, because the methods of lin-
guistics, for instance differ from those of, say, mental
chronometry. Such remarks as "the alleged logical flaws
in the argumentation from data acquired from groups of
clinically categorized patients are solved . . . ," how-
ever, suggest that what this commentator means Is that
the group study methods typical of human experimental
psychology should be applied to groups of clinically
categorised patients. This seems to Imply that I reject
group studies, but In fact I defend them (see Chapter 9) if
with some reservations (see In particular p. 212). In
addition, it seems bizarre to hold that the selection of
"clinically defined" groups requires no methods or exper-
tise different from what is needed to select student
subjects In normal human experimental psychology. 1
confess to some difficulty in understanding Grodzlnky's.
objections.
Both Hunt and Wilson make a more subtle criticism.
They argue that, despite my theoretical position support-
Ing group studies, I In practice emphasise the Importance
of single-case studies and that this confidence in single-
case methodology may be unjustified. In particular, both
commentators make the point that single-case meth-
odology routinely assumes qualitative equivalence In
functional architecture across patients and that, for some
tasks at least, there Is evidence that Individuals differ
qualitatively In the underlying processes used to carry
them out. In my view It remains an open question
whether further work on Individual differences In normal
subjects will merely converge theoretically with neuro-
psychologicai single-case methodology, as seems to be
occurring for reading by sight and by sound, or whether it
will undermine it. In any case, I do not see the basis for
Wilson's claim that the evidence of qualitative individual
differences makes group studies more useful, although I
strongly agree that the multiple single-case Is an impor-
tant design (see Shallice & Vallar 1990).
In complete contrast to the criticisms from Wilson and
Hunt (and perhaps Grodzinsky) are those of Caramazza
& McCloskey, who argue very forcefully that Inferences
cannot be made from neuropsychologicai group studies to
normal function. Referring to an argument they have put
forward on a number of occasions (e.g., Caramazza &
McCloskey 1988; McCloskey & Caramazza 1988) they say
"Shallice has obviously misunderstood the argument,"
because I referred to an example from normal psychology
where It Is Inappropriate to use group mean data, and
they hold Inferences from normal and neuropsychologicai
findings to be logically different. My example, however,
referred to the case in which what Is being tested is the
validity of a mathematical function that Is not closed
under addition, a case that has been discussed In mathe-
matical psychology (e.g., Audley & Jonckheere 1956).
This Is, of course, quite different from most uses of group
data in human experimental psychology. I was attempt-
ing to illustrate how, even with normal data, it is the type
of Inference that Is critical. Inferences from normal and
neuropsychologicai data are analogous, in this respect,
even though I do agree with the elementary neuropsy-
chologicai point that "the specific nature of the modifica-
tion [produced by brain damage] is unknown to us and
must be Inferred from their [the patient's] performance"
(see p. 219).
My argument was that certain sorts of neuropsycholo-
gicai group data - In particular these Indicating certain
types of dissociation - allow inferences to normal function
to be made just as if they came from individual patients
because the pattern exhibited by some member of each
group will exhibit generally the same overall pattern as
the group mean. An example is the findings of Graf et al.
(1984) in which a group of amnesic patients is quan-
titatively equivalent to the control group on completion
but much Inferior on recognition. These findings are at
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least as useful as a comparable pattern obtained on a
single amnesic, and this is so even if there is insufficient
data on any individual amnesic in the group to establish
reliably the contrast on that patient alone. (See pp. 207-
08 for further discussion of the conditions under which
this type of statement holds.) Moreover, if a set of group
study experiments involves patients selected by the same
criteria, then the argument can generalise over studies,
as one can assume that if the same set of patients had
undertaken all the experiments their mean performance
pattern would conform to that of the means of the groups
in the separate experiments. What Caramazza & Mc-
Closkey do not seem to realise is that my argument does
not rely on "the requirement of homogeneity of func-
tional lesion of the group's members," which they assume
to be necessary for drawing inferences from group data.
In many real group studies there are "silent cases" in one
or another group, but this does not affect the inferences
drawn.
3.2. The role of dissociations. An important criticism
made explicitly by Caplan but also implicit in the argu-
ments of Caramazza & McCloskey is that the approach
adopted in the book reifies dissociations as a necessary
reflection of an underlying damaged subcomponent. This
reading is also implicit in Jensen's provocative suggestion
that the flow-diagram models used in cognitive neuropsy-
chology are not really theories at all but complex data
descriptions of patterns of dissociations rather analogous
to cladograms. This interpretation may arise not only
from the general emphasis given to dissociations but also
from statements about the use of dissociations for theory-
discovery (e.g., p. 220). My remarks on this last topic
were much too crude; I did not emphasise it enough that
whereas dissociations are valuable in generating hypoth-
eses (say, about alternative reading and writing routes or
explicit and implicit memory-processes) many alternative
theoretical explanations need to be considered (although
Chapter 11 is devoted to this issue). I was actually trying
to show "how to select patients and make observations on
patients to produce the best chance of developing valid
theories" (p. 218) (present emphasis). This was intended
to be "a methodological heuristic for obtaining the-
oretically useful information and not an automatic induc-
tion procedure" (p. 36). 1 therefore agree with Caplan
that a double dissociation "does not license the inference
that these cognitive components [that underlie perfor-
mance on the two types of tasks] . . . are specialised
mechanisms whose primary functions are to accomplish
these tasks." I would accordingly also reject the analogy
with cladograms.
3.3. On associations. My position on inferences from
associations as contrasted with dissociations was also
criticised by Caramazza & McCloskey (as well as by
Wilson, but his premises are in conflict with those of
Caramazza & McCloskey and I find his discussion of
group studies in this respect insufficiently concrete).
Unfortunately, what substantive differences I may have
with Caramazza & McCloskey are not illuminated by
their argument. They say that if a patient shows a
qualitative and quantitative similarity between the defi-
cits manifested on two tasks, the association of deficits can
be used to constrain theoretical inferences. I entirely
agree. The quotation from Neuropsychology that these
commentators take to imply the contrary (p. 35) is
qualified in the succeeding paragraph where I point out
that "fractionation of a syndrome does not necessarily
imply that the more selective of the two disorders is the
more pure" (see also pp. 222-24). Moreover, I state
explicitly that "the impressive quantitative parallel also
means that this is one of the occasions on which it is
possible to use an association between deficits as the-
oretically relevant evidence" (p. 149; see also pp. 155-
56). Such examples of productive quantitatively parallel
associations were very rare when the book was written.
What was far more common, and what my argument
about associations in Chapter 10 was directed against, was
drawing theoretical conclusions from the existence of
impaired performance on two or more tasks, with no
quantitative or qualitative parallels between the behavior
across the tasks being shown. This situation is not consid-
ered by Caramazza & McCloskey.
3.4. On secondary aspects. Yet another example where
the methodological differences between the Johns
Hopkins group and myself are less clear than McCloskey
& Caramazza claim concerns the types of analyses used
in neuropsychological research. They argue that "models
of reading and spelling . . . have been motivated at least
as much by analyses of error types and effects of various
stimulus factors (e.g., word frequency, word length) as by
patterns of dissociations in performance levels across
tasks" - implying that I do not favour such refined
analyses. If I did not, it would be a strange rejection of my
previous work, as I was involved in the introduction of
analyses of word concreteness, word length, regularity,
levels of regularity, and typicality of correspondence in
the acquired dyslexias (e.g., Shallice & Warrington 1975;
1980; Shallice et al. 1983). In any case, there are extensive
discussions of such variables in the three chapters on
reading and spelling disorders as well as in parts of
Chapter 10. What McCloskey & Caramazza do not seem
to appreciate is that according to my approach two tasks
contributing to the overall pattern of performance can use
stimuli selected to differ on such variables (see, e.g.,
Chapter 10, pp. 228; 235; 239-40).
Although I stress the importance of the overall pattern
of performance for inference to normal function I do not
reject more detailed analyses. The latter would provide a
more tentative basis for inference, for example, because
they require a unique case approach (see pp. 35-37).
Even where errors are concerned my frequent references
to this type of evidence and my statement that they have
provided an important source of evidence (p. 224) are
ignored by McCloskey & Caramazza. Where I agree
with their criticism is that I now think examining the
nature and amount of different error types may be more
valuable heuristically than when I wrote Neuropsychol-
ogy. The recent work of these commentators has been
important in changing my mind in this respect, as has
some connectionist work I have been doing with Hinton
(Hinton & Shallice 1991).
The striking methodological principle that was new to
me amongst the commentaries was the one put forward
by Umilta based on his work with Moscovitch on demen-
tia (Moscovitch & Umilta, in press). This was the idea of
treating sparing of a function in the presence of gener-
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alised intellectual loss as an index of informational encap-
sulation. Although there are certain problems with this in
the case of strong rather than classical selective preserva-
tions, as I will discuss in the next section, the principle
seems an important and productive one.
4. The types of theories of normal function to
which neuropsfchological findings relate
4.1. On "gross, underdetailed" theorising* In Neuropsy-
chology I argued that the types of theories to which
neuropsychological findings are most easily related are
information-processing ones in which the modes of opera-
tion of the individual components are not specified in
detail. Two types of objection have been raised to this
position. First, it has been argued that this level of
theorising is "dangerous" (Bridgeman), "gross [and] un-
derdetailed" (Grodziesky) and "impoverished" (Mc-
Closkey & Caramazza; see also Jerlson). Second, it has
been argued that the approach presupposes some form of
modularity and that, for at least some mental processes,
distributed memory theories may be preferable (Allen,
Goshee-Gottsteie9 Hunt).
First, consider Bridgemae's argument that psychologi-
cal models should be realised in a fashion analogous to
Mittelstaedt's (1990) model of head-centric visual lo-
calisation, namely, with each component, specified by a
transfer function. We are far from having such models
available for most higher cognitive functions, however.
Bridgeman would argue that then we should at least use
models that have been implemented, such as Sussrnan's
(1975) on cognitive skill acquisition. Unfortunately, such
a program operates on particular mini-problems far re-
moved from those involved in, say, typical frontal lobe
tasks. Moreover, it would be a fairly pointless enterprise
to give patients the tasks faced by Sussman's program, as
the patients already have many routine procedures in
their cognitive repertory that are unavailable to the
program. Even an attempt to simulate the deficits of
frontal lobe patients using the most suitable available
problem-solving program, SOAR (Laird et al. 1987) would
face mammoth problems because SOAR lacks an adequate
model of routine performance.
The alternative I adopted was to use underspecified
theories as a first step to specifying them further.
Bridgeman does not counter the arguments presented in
Chapters 3-8 that standard information-processing theo-
ries can be applied to neuropsychological evidence more
safely now than the diagrams of nineteenth-century theo-
rists could be then. Moreover, if one takes the Superviso-
ry System model, which is prototypic of the type
Bridgeman criticised, Dehaene and Changeux (in press)
have recently put forward a detailed connectionist model
of supervisory operations in one frontal lobe task —
Wisconsin Card-Sorting. Their model makes a number of
specific assumptions that are supported on grounds of
neurobiological plausibility but, in addition to the super-
visory/routine operation division, it also uses an episodic
record to guide the selection of appropriate rules in a
given situation in a fashion analogous to the much looser
specification of the Supervisory System model.
Another view that gave rise to strong objections was
that neuropsychological findings will probably prove less
useful for determining the detailed functioning of the
mental components than for understanding the overall
nature of the functional architecture (Grodzinsky, Mc-
Closkey & Caramazza). Such a position cannot be re-
futed, however, as McCloskey & Caramazza appear to
believe, by single examples of the effective use of neuro-
psychological evidence to support fine-grained theoris-
ing. Thus the quotations from Neuropsychology that
McCloskey & Caramazza select for criticism refer to
"most favourable level" and "most important for" (my
emphasis) and not the only level. Indeed, as I discuss
some of the earliest fine-grained analyses I know of -
those on the operation of the phonological route in read-
ing (see Chapter 5.1) — it would have been ridiculous to
claim that neuropsychology could never illuminate finer
grained theoretical issues. To demonstrate the incor-
rectness of the position advocated one would need as
wide a range of effective fine-grained analyses as Neuro-
psychology provides of coarse-grained analyses. We are
far from having such analyses available.
My view would be wrong if for most subcomponents of
the cognitive system the following two conditions apply.
First, for many forms of damage to the subcomponent a
particular type of fine-grained behaviour is exhibited.
Second, this behaviour does not arise when plausible
alternative mechanisms for carrying out the function are
impaired. McCloskey & Caramazza provide no argu-
ment that this is the case. Indeed, the published one of
the two papers referred to by these commentators (Car-
amazza & Mieeli 1990) presents no mechanistic theory of
the operation of the graphemic buffer. Any theory based
on their impressive evidence would surely be more
tentative than the (far from certain) inference that the
graphemic buffer itself exists. My argument was simply
that a modular system presents neuropsychology with a
privileged level for its evidence - the coarse-grained one
- and not that inferences to other levels of operations are
impossible. As for criticisms that such a level of theory is
"impoverished" or "gross [and] underdetailed" (Grod-
zinsky), such dismissals would make sense if the func-
tional architective were as well known as say the chemical
elements. Grodzinsky may hold this to be true of lan-
guage (although that seems an overoptimistic view of
linguistics), but it is certainly not true for much of the rest
of the cognitive system.
4e2. On connectionist modelling. Most of the arguments
in the book have as a premise the existence of modularity.
As Al!ee9 Andrews, Goshen-Gcittsteie5 and Hunt point
out, this is a working hypothesis that makes sense of much
neuropsychological data rather than something for which
the book provides extensive support in the way that, say,
Fodor (1983) tries to do. The book is therefore open to the
criticism that the neuropsychological evidence could
eventually be best explicable in terms of "lesions" to
nonmodular architectures.
From critics concerned about this assumption, the
most sweeping argument was the one put forward by
Goshen-Gottstein. He takes a cognitive psychological
analogue of the double dissociation - the short-term
memory findings of Watkins and Watkins (1977) that had
been held to indicate that two stores are involved in the
retention of word span. Lewandowsky and Murdock
(1989) have shown, however, that the pattern of data can
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be explained with a complex single-store model. Goshen-
Gottstein's general argument seems irrefutable. It re-
mains possible that double dissociations may have analo-
gous explanations in terms of separate changes in two
different parameters of a nonmodular architecture. In-
deed this was the main message of Chapter 11. There is
a world of difference, however, between an abstract
possibility and a plausible alternative. Unfortunately,
Goshen-Gottstein does not consider whether the Lewan-
dowsky/Murdock theory could actually explain the short-
term memory patient findings discussed in Chapter 3.
The essence of their account of the Watkins & Watkins
findings is that span with auditory input benefits from
having an extra source of information that reduces the
number of potential competitors N at retrieval. Loss of
this source of information would limit auditory span to the
visual level and not suppress it far more as occurs in the
relevant patients (see p. 60). Moreover, a single-store
model could not produce the visual superiority effects
obtained in patients by assuming different values of the
forgetting parameter a for auditory and visual input. The
difficulties of the patients are manifested equally in item
and order recall, so the disorder cannot be simulated by
choosing some value of the other potentially relevant
parameter w as this merely produces a bias towards one or
the other of the two types of recall. Thus it does not seem
likely that the Lewandowsky/Murdock model can explain
the findings discussed in Chapter 3.
The broader possibility that other commentators in this
group raise is that connectionist models of cognition may,
when lesioned, generate behaviour analogous to that
observed in patients. The degree of challenge presented
to the theses of Neuropsychology will depend on the
extent to which the models have layers and connections
with overall functions resembling those of standard infor-
mation-processing models. For example consider the
Seidenberg-McClelland (1989) model of spelling-to-
sound translation, which has been "lesioned" (although
its ability to account for the patient data in the relevant
domain is at best mixed; see Patterson et al. 1989). Like
the Sejnowski & Rosenberg (1986) model discussed in
Neuropsychology, this model can be viewed as one form
of detailed account of the operation of the phonological
route and is indeed introduced by its authors as one
component of a fairly standard flow diagram. Other con-
nectionist models that have been "lesioned" and com-
pared with neuropsychological data - those of Mozer and
Behrmann (1990) and Hinton & Shallice (1991) - can be
viewed in somewhat similar fashion. Although a layer of
hidden units may have characteristics very different from
those of the topologically equivalent subsystem in an
information-processing model, the effects of total lesions
on overall behaviour will be similar.
The warning made by this particular group of commen-
tators cannot be dismissed, however. In at least one case a
strong dissociation has been observed when lesioning a
connectionist model - a selective preservation of the
semantic category foods, which was the result of complex
interactions in the model. The selective preservation did
not correspond to a property of the semantic category,
which was clearly independent of the model's specific
mode of operation; in this case, it was a connectionist
model using a back propagation algorithm (see Hinton &
Shallice 1991). More positively, this particular simulation
offers support for another type of neuropsychological
inference procedure - the use of the symptom-complex of
errors repeated across patients - which is at present out of
favour among cognitive neuropsychologists (see Neuro-
psychology, sec. 2.6). Wherever a lesion was made in this
connectionist network, which had a strong attractor struc-
ture, and which mapped from a letter representation to a
semantic one, the same qualitative pattern occurred with
all semantic, visual, and mixed visual or semantic errors.
Hence instead of an error-type's being a sign of the
operation of the component damaged, as in a modular
network with all-or-none transmission, the error pattern
reflected the architecture of the whole network. This
means that if connectionist models become more impor-
tant than traditional modular ones with all-or-none
transmission, then the neuropsychological evidence
would still remain relevant. The importance of strong
dissociations would decline, however, and that of
symptom-complexes may increase. If so, although
many specific methodological positions taken in Neuro-
psychology would need reconsideration, the overall
position that the neuropsychological methodology to be
adopted should depend on the general theory of the
normal cognitive system being assessed would be
strengthened.
For nonmodular connectionist models (having no cor-
respondence with any sort of information-processing
model) it is quite possible that neuropsychological evi-
dence would be unable to help us understand normal
function. The current trend in connectionist modelling
seems to be towards greater modularity, not less (Norris
1.990; Nowlan 1990), so the prospect does not seem too
disturbing for the future relevance of neuropsychological
evidence.
5. Criticisms of theories of specific areas
5.1. Short-term memory (Chapter 3). Of the six chapters
(3-8) where the approach adopted in Neuropsychology
was tested, the one that received the most criticism
concerned short-term memory (see Caplan and Cowae).
In Caplan's criticisms of the reification that can be read
into my treatment of dissociations (see sect. 3.2 above) he
uses my analysis of short-term memory patients as a
concrete example. At first glance his discussion of short-
term memory reads almost like a paraphrase of the
conclusion of Chapter 3. Thus his argument that "if
performance on STM tasks reflects the operations of the
language processing system applied to these particular
tasks, we ought to find evidence that when the structures
presented in STM-type tasks have different linguistic
features these features affect performance on these tasks"
is just what the evidence from normal subjects (Neuro-
psychology, p. 64) is intended to support. Referring to
auditory span tasks, I wrote: "Human experimental psy-
chology has attempted to study phenomena that are
essentially in one domain — sentence comprehension —
using empirical and theoretical techniques derived from
another domain - memory" (p. 67). Where we differ is
that I want to reform conceptions of short-term memory
whereas Caplan suggests that this concept may be totally
useless, merely a reification of a dissociation, and that
"performances on STM tasks may be entirely mediated
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by combinations of language processing components,
none of which have the properties assigned to STS."
Caplan would have to confront the evidence from normal
subjects, I adduce, to support the idea that auditory-
verbal span performance (at least for digits and letters)
involves primarily a single short-term store (Baddeley
1968; Lyoe 1977; Sperling & Speelman 1970; see Neuro-
psychology, p. 45).
Related arguments also present difficulties for Cowan's
approach to short-term memory from the perspective of
attention. He holds that there may be two main contribu-
tions to span - a modality-free primary memory and
speech-specific rehearsal - with short-term memory pa-
tients having a deficit in the rehearsal component or
another control process (see Cowan 1988). Yet Cowan
(1988) accounts for the auditory modality-superiority ef-
fect in short-term memory experiments (Penney 1975) in
terms of the "superior encoding of spoken temporal
sequences" (p. 168), which suggests the existence of
speech specific storage. Moreover, his supporting claim
that "suppression of rehearsal has a much more severe
impact on speech memory indices . . . than is generally
assumed" is based on the use of word span. Baddeley and
Lewis (1984) report digit span data where the reduction is
less impressive, from 7.9 to 5.7 digits. Yet short-term
memory patients can have auditory spans of 1-3 digits.
Furthermore, Cowan's argument that short-term memo-
ry patients have a problem in the rehearsal component
was considered by Shallice and Vallar (1990) and rejected
on a number of grounds, only one of which is that the
effects of suppression in normal subjects are quan-
titatively much less severe than the impairment exhibited
by some of the patients.
5.2. Disorders of attention (Chapter 13). The criticism by
Umilta of my summary sentence on neglect appears
apposite. He points out that later evidence supports the
general drift of the chapter, which implicated a problem
in shifting the attentional focus to one particular side.
Thus Costello and Warrington's (1987) patient JOH, on
whom I placed much stress, neglects both sides - but in
different situations - and so he does show that neglect is
not just an inability to move the attentional focus to one
particular "affected" side. JOH's difficulties do not con-
flict, however, with the idea that on any particular
occasion the neglect occurs because of a difficulty in
moving the atteetional focus to one side. Umilta also
points out that a major omission of this chapter was my
failure to consider theories of how the movement of an
attentional focus might be influenced by activation levels
in the contralateral hemisphere (as suggested by
Kinsbourne's (1987) view that activation in a hemisphere
is responsible for shifting attention in the contraversive
direction). From this perspective JOH's difficulties could
be explained by impairment of attentional control sys-
tems in both hemispheres: Carrying out a task that
activated one hemisphere more than the other would
then leave it more adequately activated then the comple-
mentary one.
5.3. Disorders of executlwe systems (Chapter 14). Three
general comments were made about the Supervisory
System that was used to model disorders of executive
systems. Jerison raises the old argument that a hypo-
thetical subcomponent of this sort is merely a dressed-up
version of the homunculus. This is to ignore modern
developments in artificial intelligence such as the pro-
grams of Fahlman (1974), Sussman (1975), and Laird et al.
(1987), which have special parts of their functional archi-
tecture responsible for planning, error-correction, and
impasse-resolution that are conceptually clearly distin-
guishable from the part responsible for the realisation of
routine activities (Neuropsychology, p. 334). Thus, one of
the two major innovations in the most advanced human
problem-solving simulation in existence, SOAR (Laird et
al. 1987), is that the procedure for resolving conceptual
"impasses" is a central feature of its architecture. The
function corresponds closely with that of "coping with
novelty," which is a central role of the Supervisory
System (see Neuropsychology, pp. 345-50). I am at
present engaged in a collaborative attempt to implement
parts of the Supervisory System (see also Dehaene &
Changeux, in press, discussed in 4.1).
I agree both with Butter & Laeng that further work on
the theory should be constrained by neurobiological
considerations, and with Bruder that the detailed analy-
ses applied to, say, disorders of perception, memory,
reading, and writing also need to be used in this domain.
We have recently been analysing more specific impair-
ments of the supervisory system (Shallice & Burgess, in
press). As Bruder points out, however, we currently lack
the analytical tasks that have proved so useful in other
domains. Moreover, for the reasons discussed in Neuro-
psychology (p. 336), the stable levels of performance
required for effective use of analytic tasks may be much
more difficult to obtain for investigations of executive
functions.
I contrasted a Supervisory-System interpretation of the
behaviour of frontal patients with one derived from a
classic Rosvold & Mishkin (1961) account of certain find-
ings on the loss of the ability to inhibit "central sets" in
frontally lesioned monkeys. This was a somewhat dan-
gerous contrast to make as the inability to inhibit inap-
propriate ongoing behaviour is in any case seen as one of
the functions of the Supervisory System on the Norman-
Shallice (1986) theory, and also because one critical ex-
periment, that reported by Knight (1984), was held to
discriminate most clearly between the two accounts.
Smith objects to my interpretation of the Knight study on
the grounds that it is plausible that P300 (a scalp-recorded
electrical potential) plays an inhibitory role. [See Ver-
leger: "Event-related Potential and Cognition: A Cri-
tique of the Context Updating Hypothesis and an Alter-
native Interpretation of P3," and Donchin & Coles: "Is
The P300 Component a Manifestation of Context Updat-
ing?" BBS 11(3) 1988; Naatanen: "The Role of Attention
in Auditory Information Processing as Revealed by
Event-related Potentials and Other Brain Measures of
Cognitive Functioning" BBS 13(2) 1990.] If this were the
case it would undermine my (inadequate) summary sug-
gestion that "the frontal response was not one of inade-
quate inhibition" (p. 350). The critical issue, however,
concerns the generation of the special P300 to unex-
pected novel stimuli recorded from fronto-central regions
of the brain, which is affected in Knight's (1984) frontal
lobe group, a finding that fits with the Supervisory Sys-
tem account of inappropriate responses to novel situa-
tions. Can this particular P300 be said to involve inhibi-
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tion of central sets more than the standard P300 to
infrequent targets, which was normal in the frontal lobe
patients? An explanation could perhaps be developed but
it would have to be more specific than just the claim that
the P300 plays an inhibitory role. Smith is right however,
that it is insufficient to deny the inhibition of central sets
account simply on the basis of clinical neurophysiological
findings concerning an ERP (event-related potential)
component, which is itself poorly understood. Computa-
tionally, an adequate response to novel stimuli requires
far more than mere inhibition of ongoing procedures
(Laird et al. 1987; Sussman 1975). It remains conceivable
that this is the only aspect of Supervisory System opera-
tions that is frontally localised, but this seems unlikely.
(For further relevant discussion, see Shallice & Burgess
1991).
A fascinating potential convergence that was unknown
to me when I wrote Neuropsychology is suggested by
Frith. He points out that it is possible to characterise
"negative" schizophrenia symptoms in theoretical terms
related to those I had used to account for the impairments
exhibited by frontal lobe patients. Moreover, at least
some neuropsychological evidence (Kolb & Whishaw
1983) points in the direction of an impairment of schizo-
phrenic patients on frontal lobe tasks, as well as the PET
scanning evidence quoted by Frith. In my view, conceiv-
ing of schizophrenic symptomatology in terms of a disor-
der of the Supervisory System could well prove very
fruitful. [See also Gray et al.: "The Neuropsychology of
Schizophrenia" BBS 14(1) 1991.]
5 .4. Amnesia (Chapter 16). Besides criticising my account
of Knight's (1984) experiments on P300 responses to
novelty discussed in the previous section, Smith also
objects to my account of classical amnesia, arguing that it
is purely in terms of retrieval, which "reflects selective
reporting of neurological data and a failure to simplify
through reduction." My explanation was not concerned
solely with retrieval. I suggested that there were at least
three possible forms of disconnection theory (see Chapter
15.5). Of these, only the second would correspond to a
retrieval impairment position. I somewhat preferred the
third (see p. 373), in which posteriority localised episodic
records need to be connected at presentation with more
anterior "E-MOPs" or "headings" (see p. 374) for ade-
quate retrieval to occur later. Even if the hippocampus
were no more than a staging post in the formation of such
a connection, any impairment of hippocampal function
would lead to the connections being inadequately formed.
Thus the evidence referred to on transient global amnesia
and on electrical stimulation of medial temporal lobe
structures would be compatible with the account given.
Why did I stress the posterior-frontal disconnection
theory rather than the consolidation theory associated
with the hippocampus favoured by Smith? The two theo-
ries are not in conflict and obviously in a chapter of this
length, given the enormous relevant literature, coverage
was inevitably selective, with respect to both theories and
findings. The first reason for my selection was the evi-
dence for severe amnesic states with lesions sparing the
hippocampus (p. 369), as in Korsakoff patients with le-
sions involving the mamillary bodies and thalamus (e.g.,
Mair et al. 1979), in thalamic stroke patients (e.g., Gen-
tilini et al. 1987; Graff-Radford et al. 1990; von Cramon et
al. 1985) and in patients with tumours affecting the fornix
(e.g., Rudge & Warrington, in press; Valenstein et al.
1987). Smith alludes to this evidence, but dismisses it on
the grounds that there are direct cortical efferents from
the hippocampus to the parahippocampal gyrus and also
from there to the frontal cortex. Thus he argues that
lesions in the Papez circuit could not disconnect posterior
from frontal cortices. The region of the frontal cortex
involved in the work of Goldman-Rakic (1988b) he cites,
sulcus principalis, may not have any relation to long-term
episodic memory; Goldman-Rakic (1987), for example,
argues that it is specialised for spatial working memory.
By contrast, the eventual target of the hippocampal-
mamillary-thalamic connections could well be some other
anterior region. Moreover, if like Smith, one rejects the
disconnection theory, how else are amnesias arising from
the lesion sites mentioned above to be explained?
A second and more important reason for being con-
cerned with the disconnection account of amnesia is that a
major strand of Chapter 15 was that in its classical form as
found, say, in pure Korsakoff patients amnesia involves a
very long-lasting retrograde component. Contrary to
much current opinion, I argued that the retrograde am-
nesia was not dependent on the age of the memory but on
its nature, that is, as being episodic as opposed to
semantic.
If any consolidation process existed it would not relate
to this characterisation of the syndrome (although the
characterisation would be entirely compatible with theo-
ry that the hippocampus indexes episodic traces). Yet
Smith does not challenge my arguments about retrograde
amnesia. Moreover, Warrington and McCarthy (1988)
have reported evidence that, in an amnesic patient, the
meanings of words learned during the period affected by a
dense retrograde amnesia were retained, which indicates
that it is the nature of the material rather than the age of
the trace that is critical. Instead, Smith cites the recent
paper of Zola-Morgan & Squire (1990), which provides
very interesting evidence for a consolidation process
lasting a few weeks. It should be noted that the critical
evidence favouring a consolidation process, as opposed to
just the presence of the permastore type of trace that
Bahrick (1984) characterised semantic memory as con-
taining, is the better performance of hippocampal
monkeys on older rather than more recently learned
items; this evidence is based on selective post-hoc tests,
however, and not the more appropriate trend test. More-
over, it could be a characteristic of semantic memory in
general that items in a particular domain learned earlier
produce somewhat stronger traces than equivalent items
learned later. This would fit with the known excessive
sensibility of amnesics to proactive interference (War-
rington & Weiskrantz 1978; Winocur & Kinsbourne
1978). The most crucial point, however, is that the time-
period of the operation of any form of consolidation
process of the kind Zola-Morgan and Squire posit - a few
weeks — is the wrong order of magnitude for the retro-
grade components of classical amnesia.
5.5. Consciousness (Chapter 16). Many commentators
referred to the functionalist approach to consciousness
that I adopted to interpret the neuropsychological syn-
dromes that relate to awareness. Frith differed from the
others in proposing an approach similar to mine in an-
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other empirical domain - that of schizophrenic experi-
ences such as delusions of alien control. If, as discussed
earlier, the cognitive disorders of schizophrenia are to be
understood, at least in part, as disorders of the Superviso-
ry System then such patients should also have abnormal
phenomenal experience.1
As various commentators (e.g., Allen9 Flanagan)
noted, there was an unresolved tension in my position on
consciousness between, on the one hand, the idea that no
single system or subsystem subserves conscious experi-
ence and, on the other hand, the central role ascribed to
the Supervisory System and the use of the William James
analogy about consciousness as the property of an organ.
Allen9 Bridgemae, and Flanagan all agreed with me in
rejecting the idea that consciousness is attributable to a
single component. Others (Baars, Cowae), however,
presupposed that consciousness derives from the opera-
tion of one single subsystem - a global workspace, or the
Supervisory System.
I do not find the latter view very plausible for reasons
similar to those discussed by Flaeagae0 To argue, as
Baars does, for the relevance of a single system that "any
conscious (or effortful) tasks will compete against any
other" is in my view, to overestimate the degree to which
two routine but demanding tasks that do not require the
same processing structures compete (see e.g., Allport et
al. 1972; Shallice et al. 1985), and to ignore the possibility
that the interference might result from "cross-talk" rather
than demands on a common subsystem. It also over-
simplifies the phenomenology of dual task performance
(see Shallice 1988). Moreover, I see no reason to assume,
as Baars does, that the workspace of complex Al problem-
solving systems can be considered isomorphic with the
contents of consciousness; this would not be the case, for
example, with the contents of SOAR'S short-term memory
(Laird et al. 1987). More critically, as 1 stated (p. 401), no
syndrome fits well with the characterisation of damage to
a globally distributed database. Umilta makes a more
general point of the same type.
Allen makes two main criticisms of the specific posi-
tions I took on consciousness. First, he argues that my
somewhat frivolous justification for ignoring the problem
of qualia when adopting a functionalist approach is inade-
quate. However, I fail to see why it is not a reasonable
strategy to operate on the assumption that a difficulty that
is "conceptual" (Allen) may not be resolved at some
future date as scientific ones can be.
Allen's second objection is that the assumption that the
conscious/nonconscious distinction concerns the con-
cepts an organism uses to understand itself is "mysterious
unless we know where such understanding lies." I agree
that my theorising focused on what internal representa-
tions, and particularly those in what system, are and are
not conscious. I barely touched the question of what
additional thoughts or actions become available when one
becomes conscious of some mental content, and es-
pecially what it means for these states to be known to the
organism. All three of these issues can in principle be
tackled by the methods of cognitive science, however.
Hence, although they are now mysterious, I do not see
why they need to remain so.
If scientific answers can be provided for such questions
it will also resolve certain of the problems I had with the
comments of Flanagan* I feel particularly sympathetic to
his criticisms. In my first writing on consciousness (Shal-
lice 1972) I tried to show that the information-processing
functions related to consciousness did not require the
assumption of a single controlling subsystem. The later
neuropsychological and artificial intelligence literature
led Norman and me to support the idea of a Supervisory
System. Such a system would have a less central role in
cognition than, say, the controlled processing of Shiffrin
and Schneider (1977). Does it then deserve its name and
its capital letters? The other control systems (apart from
contention scheduling) discussed in Neuropsychology
were seen to be evolutionarily dependent on and fully
interconnected with the Supervisory System. The exis-
tence and typical operation of these interconnections
were taken to provide the material basis for the concept of
consciousness.
What would happen if the Supervisory System frac-
tionated into separable subsystems? The evidence of
Petrides (1987) on separable specific higher-level frontal
lobe disorders, together with the tight interconnections
of the relevant frontal lobe regions with particular regions
of parietal lobe (Goldman-Rakic 1987), might suggest that
different modulatory subsystems exist that are fairly inde-
pendent of each other computationally. This is probably
too extreme a view. In any case, among the scientific
questions to be addressed by future research are: How
close is the interdependence of the control subsystems
with each other? and do they conceptually form a system,
or a set of intercommunicating but evolutionarily distinct
subsystems? Or do they have little or only negative (i.e.,
inhibitory) communication with each other? In my view,
it is the answer to such scientific questions that will
determine our future understanding of consciousness (as
well as whether Flanagan is right to dismiss the role of
individual systems so completely).
NOTE
1. A minor empirical point: Jerison is right that Hindsight
was conceptually derived from monkey work, at least as far as
the Weiskrantz et al. (1974) study was concerned. [See also
Campion et al.: "Is Blindsight an Effect of Scattered Light,
Spared Cortex, and Near-Threshold Vision?" BBS 6(3) 1983.]
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